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REPLACING GEOGRAPHIC LINES WITH CONCEPTUAL
LINES: A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED AUTHORIZATION
OF MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW
Patrick Medley*
Abstract: State regulations have created substantial barriers to lawyers who engage in
multijurisdictional practice of law. Applying the amorphous concept of practice of law to
modern society results in many lawyers who knowingly or unknowingly practice in multiple
states—including states where they are not admitted to the bar. Yet there is no simple means
by which a lawyer can obtain permission to engage in multijurisdictional practice in the United
States.
This Comment proposes a way for Congress to authorize multijurisdictional practice for
some aspects of legal practice without completely displacing the role of state bars. Drawing on
analogies to the division of legal practice in the United Kingdom and other commonlaw
countries, this Comment argues that the inherent difference between in-court and out-of-court
practice—epitomized in the barrister and solicitor roles—defines the proper dividing line
between what Congress should and should not preempt. This Comment thus proposes a scheme
of decentralized authorization for multijurisdictional practice in a solicitor-like capacity, while
reserving decisions about in-court representation to the states.

INTRODUCTION
A newly minted attorney, fresh from having passed the Oregon bar,
hangs up her shingle in Portland, Oregon. A client contacts the attorney
about a new case: he works as a fisherman and was injured while fishing
in Canadian waters. He is currently being treated across the Columbia
River in Vancouver, Washington, where the attorney also lives. He wants
to bring an action in federal court under maritime law. The two meet at a
hospital in Vancouver, discuss the case, and sign a contingency
agreement.
Unfortunately, the attorney may have just committed unauthorized
practice of law in Washington.1 Even if the attorney told her client up front
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I am also a practicing
patent agent, so I have been able to experience the same freedom of interstate practice within my
chosen field that this Comment advocates for lawyers in general. I would like to thank Professor Hugh
Spitzer for his guidance in the early stages of writing this piece and the Washington Law Review
editorial staff for their support and suggestions.
1. Cf. Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. 2d 180, 182–84 (Fla. 1995) (finding unauthorized
practice in Florida under similar facts).
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that she was not admitted to practice in Washington and that she would
only be able to represent him in federal court, where she was admitted to
practice, this may not save her from charges of unauthorized practice.2
She could even face criminal charges.3
Upon realizing all of this and fearing these consequences, the attorney
decides never to leave the state of Oregon. She eventually lands a large
corporate client that wants to hire her on a continuing basis to handle a
variety of legal matters. The client is a California corporation with offices
in many states, including Oregon. The attorney only works from her office
in Oregon and sends her work product by email and telephone to her client
in California. Alas, even though she has never set foot in California, by
handling corporate matters for the California corporation and
communicating legal advice remotely, she may once again face charges
of unauthorized practice of law.4
Admittedly, the odds of being prosecuted for these types of violations
are small.5 Perhaps lawyers should just flout the law and trust that they
will beat the odds?6 On the other hand lawyers, as a species, are often
considered risk-averse.7 This risk aversion can benefit clients by
2. See id. at 182.
3. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.48.180(2), (3)(a) (2019).
4. See, e.g., Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Cal.
1998) (observing that virtual presence in California can constitute practice of law in California);
Daniel A. Vigil, Regulating In-House Counsel: A Catholicon or a Nostrum?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 307,
312 (1994) (concluding, based on response from the California chief justice to a hypothetical problem
mirroring the text facts, that “California likely would consider the hypothetical fact pattern to be the
unauthorized practice of law”).
5. Sara J. Lewis, Note, Charting the “Middle” Way: Liberalizing Multijurisdictional Practice
Rules for Lawyers Representing Sophisticated Clients, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 631, 634 (2009); see
also Vigil, supra note 4, at 311–12 (discussing low likelihood of enforcement in several states).
6. Unfortunately, this appears to be the road many attorneys are forced to take. See Lewis supra
note 5, at 634 (“Practicing attorneys violate [multijurisdictional practice] rules ‘habitually’ and on a
‘daily basis.’” (first quoting Charles W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession:
Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 685–
86 (1995), and then quoting Diane Leigh Babb, Take Caution When Representing Clients Across State
Lines: The Services Provided May Constitute the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 50 ALA. L. REV.
535, 535 (1999))). The Washington State Bar provides a way of estimating how many in-house engage
in this kind of practice. Washington requires out-of-state lawyers working as in-house counsel to
register as “House Counsel.” WASH. ADMISSION & PRACTICE R. 8(f). A search of the legal directory
of the Washington State Bar Association reveals 301 active, registered house counsel, compared to
32,661
active
members
of
the
bar.
Legal
Directory,
MYWSBA,
https://www.mywsba.org/personifyebusiness/LegalDirectory.aspx [https://perma.cc/N3SN-F3AT]
(301 active, registered house counsel). By comparison, Daniel A. Vigil estimated over 8,000 of
California’s 125,000 lawyers were in-house counsel. Vigil, supra note 4. If these ratios hold true
generally, this suggests about one in every seven or eight in-house counsel in a state is not a member
of the state’s bar.
7. See Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, Symposium on the 21st Century Lawyer: On Teaching
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tempering their own risk preference and alerting them to risks they would
otherwise ignore.8 Yet it can also lead lawyers to systematically
overestimate risks, and thus be excessively deterred in their practice,
particularly where legal consequences are uncertain.9
And where rules against unauthorized practice of law are concerned,
uncertainty is a major problem. Not only is “practice of law” ill-defined
as a concept, but so too is the question of which state—or states—an
attorney is practicing law in.10 Nor can one realistically avoid the danger
of engaging in unauthorized practice by becoming authorized: licensure
is on a state-by-state basis, so it is impossible to simply receive a blanket
authorization to practice law.11
States have justified their restrictions on practice of law primarily on
consumer-protection grounds.12 But the current system of controlling the
practice of law at the state level inhibits interstate practice in a manner not
justified by these arguments.13 Thus, there is a need for Congress to
intervene.14
This Comment discusses the problems involved in the current system
of regulation of the practice of law and proposes a way that Congress can
enable lawyers to practice law across state lines in some, but not all,
aspects of legal practice. Part I discusses how the current system of
regulation of law by individual states works and the barriers to
multijurisdictional practice of law that result. Part II describes the tools
available for Congress to intervene, the areas in which Congress already
authorizes interstate practice of law, and the extent to which Congress
may be limited in its intervention. Part II concludes by identifying a
longstanding way of dividing the legal profession into in-court and outof-court practice as a candidate for drawing the line between the types of
Professional Judgment, 69 WASH. L. REV. 527, 541 (1994); Susan R. Helper, Comment, Governing
Alliances: Advancing Knowledge and Controlling Opportunism, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 929, 931
(2003). But cf. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Risks, Goals, and Pictographs: Lawyering to the Social
Entrepreneur, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 301, 304 (2015) (“The idea that lawyers are risk averse is
often presented in legal scholarship as fact, with little to no empirical or anecdotal evidence.”).
8. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. &
FIN. 486, 495 (2007).
9. Donald C. Langevoort and Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in
Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 379, 438 (1997).
10. See infra section I.A.
11. Subject to exceptions in certain fields where federal law preempts state restrictions, such as
those discussed in section II.B. Outside of these types of exceptions, to be authorized in every state,
one must apply to each for admission to the bar. See infra section I.B.
12. See infra section I.D.
13. See infra sections I.C.I.D.
14. See infra Part II.
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interstate practice that Congress should and should not authorize. Part III
describes how Congress can use this dividing line to preempt local state
monopolies on the practice of law and provide for uniform, interstate
practice of law outside of court. Finally, Part IV describes how Congress
could implement a decentralized system of admission for interstate
solicitor-like practice.
I.

STATE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE PRACTICE OF LAW

This Part discusses the way the practice of law is currently regulated,
including the scope of states’ regulation of the profession,15 the manner in
which that regulation is controlled,16 and the effect state regulation has on
the practice of law and the provision of legal services.17 Finally, this Part
discusses the degree to which these regulations can benefit the public.18
A.

Scope of State Regulation

Traditionally, states have been the primary regulators of the practice of
law.19 The states’ power to regulate practice of law has long been
recognized, despite the burdens such regulations can impose upon the
public.20 Regulating the practice of law in a jurisdiction includes
determining what counts as legal practice in that jurisdiction.21
Generally, states authorize practice of law for members of the state’s
bar.22 As a corollary, they generally prohibit practice of law by
nonlawyers, meaning “anyone who does not comport with state Bar
requirements.”23 For example, Washington State criminalizes the
15. See infra section I.A.
16. See infra section I.B.
17. See infra section I.C.
18. See infra section I.D.
19. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
20. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (“That the
States have broad power to regulate the practice of law is, of course, beyond question. But it is equally
apparent that broad rules framed to protect the public and to preserve respect for the administration
of justice can in their actual operation significantly impair the value of associational freedoms.”
(internal citations omitted)).
21. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 19, Canon 3, note 2 (“What
constitutes unauthorized practice of the law in a particular jurisdiction is a matter for determination
by the courts of that jurisdiction.”) (quoting ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op.
198 (1939)).
22. See, e.g., Elana Nightingale Dawson, Lawyers’ Responsibilities Under Title III of the ADA: Ensuring
Communication Access for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 1143, 1171 (2011).
23. Osman E. Nawaz, You Are Not a Lawyer: Does Representation of Carriers by Non-Lawyers in
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Enforcement Cases Constitute the Unauthorized
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unlawful practice of law, which occurs when a nonlawyer “practices law,
or holds himself or herself out as entitled to practice law.”24 Unlawful
practice of law also occurs when nonlawyers and lawyers join in a firm or
similar business to practice law or otherwise share legal fees.25
Practice of law is defined in Washington as “the application of legal
principles and judgment with regard to the circumstances or objectives of
another entity or person(s) which require the knowledge and skill of a
person trained in the law.”26 This includes advising others of their rights
in exchange for consideration; selecting, drafting, or completing legal
documents for others; representation in court and similar proceedings; and
negotiation of others’ legal rights and responsibilities.27
Some states treat unauthorized practice as a criminal matter, while
others treat it as a civil matter.28 But most states prohibit the practice of
law by those who are not a member of the state’s bar, even if they are
members of another state’s bar.29 Determining the outer limits of the
practice of law is fact-intensive, and states vary substantially in their
definitions.30 Indeed, some states have given up entirely.
For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas concluded that a clear
definition was impossible: “Research of authorities by able counsel and
Practice of Law?, 32 TRANSP. L.J. 21, 22 (2004).
24. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.48.180(2)(a) (2019); see also id. § 2.48.180(3)(a) (“Unlawful practice
of law is a crime. A single violation of this section is a gross misdemeanor.”).
25. Id. §§ 2.48.180(2)(b)–(e).
26. WASH. GEN. R. 24(a) (2019).
27. Id.; see also Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 443, 446, 635 P.2d
730, 732 (1981) (“[Practice of law] is generally acknowledged to include not only the doing or
performing of services in the courts of justice, throughout the various stages thereof, but in a larger
sense includes legal advice and counsel and the preparation of legal instruments by which legal rights
and obligations are established.” (quoting Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 91 Wash. 2d 48, 54, 586 P.2d 870, 875 (1978)).
28. Compare CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6126 (2019) (unauthorized practice a misdemeanor in
California), and N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6512 (2019) (unauthorized practice a felony in New York), with
UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. Rule 14-111(a) (2019) (stating unauthorized practice in Utah “shall not
constitute a crime”), and Del. State Bar Ass’n v. Alexander, 386 A.2d 652, 665 (Del. 1978) (noting
“the unauthorized practice of law is not a criminal offense in [Delaware]”).
29. See Pamela A. McManus, Have Law License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 538
(2002). But see COLO. R. CIV. P. § 205.1 (2018) (allowing practice of law by out-of-state lawyers
non-courtroom context); see generally David A. Gerregano, Annotation, What Constitutes
“Unauthorized Practice of Law” by Out-of-State Counsel, 83 A.L.R. 5th 497 (2000).
30. McManus, supra note 29. Many states eschew statutory definitions of “practice of law,” leaving
it to courts to determine on a case-by-case basis. Id. For a comprehensive list of different states’
definitions of practice of law, see A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE
OF
LAW, STATE DEFINITIONS OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW app. A (2003),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/modeldef_migrated/model_def_statutes.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7JZ-BDR7].
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by this court has failed to turn up any clear, comprehensible definition of
what really constitutes the practice of law.”31 Broadly speaking, the result
is a “lack of a nationwide consensus on what constitutes the ‘practice of
law.’”32 The amorphous nature of practice of law can lead to particularly
thorny issues when lawyers engage in activities that cross state lines.
An example of the wide range of interstate activities that can implicate
state unauthorized practice laws is Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon &
Frank v. Superior Court.33 In Birbrower, the California Supreme Court
held that when lawyers from New York visited a California client to
discuss a private arbitration proceeding and filed for private arbitration in
San Francisco, the out-of-state lawyers were practicing law in
California.34 Although the lawyers in Birbrower did visit California,
presence in California was not necessary to practice law there: the court
explained that “one may practice law in the state . . . although not
physically present here by advising a California client on California law
in connection with a California legal dispute by telephone, fax, computer,
or other modern technological means.”35 The court “reject[ed] the notion
that a person automatically practices law ‘in California’ whenever that
person practices California law anywhere, or ‘virtually’ enters the state by
telephone, fax, e-mail, or satellite,” holding that a case-by-case analysis
was required.36 However, the upshot of Birbrower is that any contact with
California in the course of practicing law might put an out-of-state
attorney at risk of unauthorized practice, without the attorney having any
practical way to know until after charges were filed.37

31. Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Block, 323 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Ark. 1959); accord State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz.
Land Title & Tr. Co., 366 P.2d 1, 8–9 (Ariz. 1961) (“In the light of the historical development of the
lawyer’s functions, it is impossible to lay down an exhaustive definition of ‘the practice of law’ by
attempting to enumerate every conceivable act performed by lawyers in the normal course of their
work.”).
32. Hugh D. Spitzer, Model Rule 5.7 and Lawyers in Government Jobs—How Can They Ever Be
“Non-Lawyers”?, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 45, 52 (2017); see also id. at 45, 52–54 (arguing that the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct fail to adequately distinguish between “lawyer” and “nonlawyer” functions, potentially forcing attorneys to treat any law-related activity as though it were
practice of law).
33. 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998).
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id. at 5–6.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Cf. La Tanya James & Siyeon Lee, Adapting the Unauthorized Practice of Law Provisions to
Modern Legal Practice, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1135, 1140 (2001) (“Birbrower generated a great
deal of concern and anxiety among lawyers and created uncertainty about what level of legal work
and activity would constitute the unlawful practice of law.”).
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Not all states have gone as far as California did in Birbrower,38 and
some have made attempts to avoid parallel situations. For example,
amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to permit small
amounts of temporary practice by out-of-state lawyers.39 This relaxation
has only been adopted in some states, however; California, in particular,
is not among them and for that reason Birbrower’s broad definition likely
still holds.40 But even in states that have not gone as far as California, the
amorphous definition of practice of law, coupled with the need to evaluate
each case on its own facts, means the risk remains that any given
connection to a state might implicate its unauthorized practice laws.41
Moreover, state regulation of the practice of law is not limited to
matters involving the law of that state. States generally prohibit the
practice of law pertaining to any legal matter, even when lawyers in the
state only handle matters involving the law of other jurisdictions.42 For
example, in Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis,43 the Florida Supreme Court held
that an attorney residing in Florida, but licensed only outside Florida,
engaged in unlicensed practice of law when he gave a Greek seaman prelitigation advice and entered into a contingent fee contract with him.44
That the attorney informed the client that he was not admitted to practice
law in Florida was of no moment.45 Nor did it help that (1) the matter
solely involved federal maritime law; (2) the attorney was admitted to
practice in Massachusetts and in federal courts; or (3) the attorney “was
especially well qualified in the practice and teaching of maritime law.”46
38. See, e.g., Fought & Co. v. Steel Eng’g & Erection, Inc., 951 P.2d 487, 496–99 (Haw. 1998)
(holding that Oregon counsel did not engage in unauthorized practice of law in Hawai’i despite
consulting with a Hawai’i client, doing research for the client’s case, and planning appellate strategy
because the conduct occurred primarily in Oregon and local counsel handled the case itself).
39. See WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH,
278–79 (2d ed. 2016).
40. Id.
41. See Spitzer, supra note 32, at 54.
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5(b) (prohibiting any lawyer not admitted to
practice in a jurisdiction from establishing a “systematic and continuous presence in [that] jurisdiction
for the practice of law”); id. r. 5.5(c)–(d) (recognizing only limited exceptions, including “services
that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or rule to provide in this jurisdiction”); id. cmt.
1 (“A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice.”);
David G. Ebner, Crossing the Border: Issues in Multistate Practice of Law, in 35 ROCKY MT. MIN.
L. INST. 2-1, § 2.03, at 2–13 n.38 (1989) (“It is, of course, clear that a resident lawyer, not licensed
by the state, may not avoid unauthorized practice sanctions simply by limiting his practice to federal
questions.”).
43. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995).
44. Id. at 182–84.
45. See id. at 187–88 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 187.
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The same basic principle holds in other states as well: practice of any law
in connection with a state equally implicates the state’s monopoly on the
practice of law, “whether the legal principles . . . were established
by . . . [the state], some other state of the United States, the United States
of America, or a foreign nation.”47
Thus, neither by avoiding physical presence in a state nor by avoiding
cases involving the state’s laws can attorneys shield themselves from
charges of unauthorized practice of law in states where they are not
admitted: even the thinnest of contacts raises the specter of unauthorized
practice. To understand the import of states’ broad rules against
unauthorized practice of law, it is necessary to understand how states
authorize the practice of law.
B.

The Way States Control Practice of Law

Because states only forbid unauthorized practice of law, understanding
the effect of state regulations requires an understanding of how states
determine when to grant and when to withhold authorization to practice
law. This section discusses how the states determine who is and is not
authorized to practice law, and how the manner of regulation chosen by
the states has produced localized monopolies in legal practice.
To enforce laws against unauthorized practice of law, it is essential to
have a method to determine who is and is not authorized. Just as the
question of what constitutes practice of law is complicated and factintensive,48 so too is the question of how to determine who is authorized
to practice law.49 While many states address this question in part through
legislation, entry into practice is ultimately controlled “by the judiciary,
and hence effectively by the bar,” thus putting lawyers themselves in
charge of the regulation of the practice of law.50 Judicial control is
widespread: the American Bar Association has concluded that “judicial
regulation of all lawyers is a principle firmly established . . . in every

47. Kennedy v. The Bar Ass’n of Montgomery Cty., Inc., 561 A.2d 200, 209 (Md. 1989); accord
Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 139 A.2d 889, 893 (Pa. 1958); see, e.g., In re Roel, 144 N.E.2d 24, 26 (N.Y.
1957) (same principle applies in New York); cf. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979) (“[T]he
Constitution does not require that because a lawyer has been admitted to the bar of one State, he or
she must be allowed to practice in another.” (citing Ginsburg, 139 A.2d at 893)).
48. See supra section I.A.
49. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of Recent
Increases to Passing Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 936 (2001) (discussing the
difficulty of determining whether bar exam difficulty is set to high or too low).
50. Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional
Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1698 (2008).
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state.”51 This arrangement, by which lawyers directly or indirectly control
entry into their own profession, results in a legal monopoly, because by
controlling access to the legal profession in a state, that state’s lawyers
can set barriers to entry to reduce competition.52 By controlling who is
authorized to practice law, states control who is allowed to compete in the
market for legal services.53
Receiving a general authorization to practice law in a state requires
admission to the state’s bar, which is typically determined though the
state’s bar examination.54 In the majority of states, admission to the bar
requires taking the Uniform Bar Exam (UBE), and many states add a
jurisdiction-specific test either before or after taking the UBE.55 Each
participating jurisdiction independently sets a passing score on the exam,
with current minimum passing scores ranging from 260 to 280.56
Additionally, most states require a passing score on the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE),57 as well as certain
51. Id. (quoting ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM

116 (1992)).
52. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview of the
Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2581 (1999); see also Deborah L. Rhode,
Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized
Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (1981) (pointing out that lawyers’ self-regulation
technically constitutes a cartel, rather than a monopoly); Soha F. Turfler, Note, A Model Definition of
the Practice of Law: If Not Now, When? An Alternative Approach to Defining the Practice of Law,
61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1903, 1916–17 (2004) (“The resulting ‘legal monopoly’ allows for
uncompetitive prices, and as the costs of legal services rise, less affluent individuals are pushed out
of the market.”).
53. See generally Denckla, supra note 52 (discussing how control over authorization to practice
has given monopoly power to state bars and reduced competition).
54. Abigail L. Deblasis, Another Tile in the “Jurisdictional Mosaic” of Lawyer Regulation:
Modifying Admission by Motion Rules to Meet the Needs of the 21st Century Lawyer, 38 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 205, 208 (2018).
55. See Understanding the Uniform Bar Examination, NCBE (2019), (adapting Presentation, Nat’l
Conf. of B. Examiners (July 2017)), http://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F209
[https://perma.cc/9SU8-HH5U] (showing adoption of the UBE by thirty-two states, the District of
Columbia, and the Virgin Islands as of 2019, with Ohio joining in 2020). The UBE was introduced
recently, with the first adoption in 2010 by Missouri. See Debra Cassens Weiss, With Missouri Move,
Idea of Uniform Bar Exam Finally Gets Legs, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 29, 2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/with_missouri_move_idea_of_uniform_bar_exam_finally_get
s_legs [https://perma.cc/T8M7-3DFB]. Prior to the introduction of the UBE, states used entirely separate
admissions criteria, but nearly all states used the Multistate Bar Examination (a UBE component) as part
of their admissions process. See Merritt et al., supra note 49, at 932 (noting that all but three states used
the Multistate Bar Examination as of 2001).
56. Understanding the Uniform Bar Examination, supra note 55.
57. See, e.g., Hon. David L. Baker, The Future of Legal Education: Should Law-School
Applications Include a Warning Label?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1495, 1506 (2011). The MPRE is a
multiple-choice test of the professional standards for practice of law. See Multistate Professional
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other requirements such as evaluation of the attorney’s character and
fitness.58 Passing the bar is a substantial and difficult undertaking59 and
thus represents a significant barrier to entry into the legal profession.
There are two main alternatives to the normal bar admission process
that provide some limited mitigation of this barrier: reciprocity and pro
hac vice admission.60 Pro hac vice admission allows an attorney who is
not a member of a state’s bar to practice within a state, but that admission
is limited to a specific matter. Furthermore, admission is only available in
relation to court proceedings, not transactional practice.61 This can lead to
absurd situations like that in the Florida case of Chandris, S.A. v.
Yanakakis.62
In Chandris, a highly-qualified attorney admitted to another state’s bar,
who would be undoubtedly qualified for pro hac vice admission,
committed unauthorized practice by entering an agreement to represent
the client in court.63 Thus, pro hac vice admission only provides sporadic
relief from the barriers of entry to legal practice in a state, and it does
nothing to help practice outside of a courtroom context,64 where the
question of whether a lawyer is conducting unauthorized practice of law
is most uncertain.65
Reciprocity admission provides a larger scope of protection to an
attorney’s practice. This type of admission involves the use of admission
in one state’s bar to shortcut admission into the bar of another state.66
Because recipients of reciprocity admission are authorized to practice,
they need no longer fear prosecution for unauthorized practice from the
reciprocating state, regardless of the matter involved. Reciprocity
Responsibility Examination, NCBE, http://www.ncbex.org/exams/mpre/ [https://perma.cc/7F3HLLUG]. It is used as a qualification requirement in U.S. jurisdictions except Wisconsin and Puerto
Rico. Id.
58. Deblasis, supra note 54, at 258.
59. Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429, 446 (2001).
60. See Gerregano, supra note 29, at 1a; McManus, supra note 29, at 533–34.
61. Turfler, supra note 52, at 1914–15.
62. 668 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1995).
63. See id. at 182–83; id. at 187–88 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (“[The attorney] was, at all material
times, admitted to practice in the federal courts and in Massachusetts, and he was especially well
qualified in the practice and teaching of maritime law . . . . Presumably, under the majority analysis,
a Massachusetts lawyer, like Yanakakis, could have come to Florida and properly done the same
things that Yanakakis did.”).
64. See Turfler, supra note 52, at 1914–15.
65. See supra section I.A (discussing the ill-defined boundaries of the practice of law outside of
court).
66. McManus, supra note 29, at 533.
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admission often involves additional requirements, such as a length of time
in practice, intent to substantially practice, and independent fitness
evaluation requirements.67 Whether reciprocity is available is determined
between different states on a pairwise basis, with the normal model being
a symmetrical exchange: State A will only grant admission to State B
attorneys if State B does the same to attorneys in State A.68
There are some weaknesses in this apparently symmetrical system,
however. For example, the UBE provides for score portability, in which
scores on the UBE used for one state’s bar exam can be used for bar
admission in other states.69 But this introduces a qualification to the
symmetry: a passing score in one state may not qualify for reciprocity in
another state requiring a higher score.70 Thus, by raising the passing score,
a state can continue to reap the benefits of reciprocity with other UBE
states while preventing many of those states’ lawyers from competing
within the state.71 Because this eliminates a pressure to adopt uniform bar
admission standards and incentivizes artificially high admissions
requirements,72 this may reduce the effectiveness of reciprocity in
lowering barriers to entry.
Other aspects of reciprocity further weaken the reciprocity system’s
ability to mitigate monopoly effects of states’ bar admission rules. First,
as mentioned above, most states attach additional requirements to
reciprocity admission, including requiring a certain minimum length of
time in practice, demonstration of an intent to substantially practice in the
reciprocating state, and independent evaluations of character and fitness
requirements.73 Lawyers who do not meet these extra requirements may
lose out on reciprocity’s protection.
Moreover, reciprocity admission requires an application, and is not

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Understanding the Uniform Bar Examination, supra note 55.
70. See id.
71. For example, Alaska’s current UBE minimum passing score is 280, while Missouri’s is 260.
Id. All passing Alaska UBE scores are thus “portable” to Missouri for admission purposes, unlike in
Missouri, where attorneys scoring between 260 and 280 would not be able to use their UBE scores to
qualify for admission in Alaska. See id.
72. In particular, raising passing scores allow states to confer a benefit to their lawyers (reduced
competition) without incurring a corresponding cost (because they can still be authorized to practice
in states with lower requirements).
73. McManus, supra note 29, at 533; cf. Understanding the Uniform Bar Examination, supra note
55 (showing, in contrast to the minimum practice term requirements of reciprocity, various
“maximum ages” for transferring UBE scores, from two years to five years).
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automatic,74 so an attorney cannot simply rely on the availability of
reciprocity to another state to avoid engaging in unauthorized practice—
the attorney must actually apply (and be admitted) in advance of
practicing. Thus, even if an attorney qualifies for reciprocity, actually
taking advantage of it requires advance knowledge of which jurisdictions
the lawyer will end up practicing in, which is hard to determine in
retrospect, much less in advance.75
Finally, many states do not engage in reciprocity at all: California, for
example, does not reciprocate with any state.76 This results in disjointed
cliques of reciprocating and non-reciprocating states, with multiple
islands of no reciprocity at all.77 This patchwork of reciprocating and nonreciprocating states has been criticized as a “balkaniz[ation]” of the
American legal profession “by the geographical limits of state lines.”78
Thus, the current system of self-governance in state bar admissions has
generated a patchwork of localized monopolies that inhibit free movement
between states. Some avenues exist by which lawyers can avoid the
resulting barriers to entry, but the extent of these safeguards is limited.
The result is that lawyers continue to face burdens from state regulations
when practicing across state lines.
C.

The Burden of State Regulations on the Multistate Practice of Law

The most obvious burden produced by the current system of regulating
the practice of law is economic: state restrictions on practice reduce
supply of lawyers, thus raising the price of legal services and reducing the
quantity supplied.79 This problem is closely tied to laws prohibiting
interstate practice, because states impose barriers to admission to protect
local attorneys from competition.80 Monopoly pricing involves the power
74. McManus, supra note 29, at 533.
75. For example, an attorney who unexpectedly finds himself practicing in a foreign jurisdiction
due to a “virtual presence” rule, see supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text (discussing
Birbrower), may be committing unauthorized practice even if he would have qualified for reciprocity
in the state in question.
76. McManus, supra note 29, at 533. For a comprehensive guide to current bar admission
requirements, see COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS (NAT’L CONFERENCE
OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR
2018) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissio
ns_to_the_bar/2018_ncbe_comp_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNW2-WEQX].
77. See generally Reciprocity – Attorneys, USLEGAL, https://attorneys.uslegal.com/licensing-ofattorneys/reciprocity/ [https://perma.cc/AP9M-KABW].
78. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 865 (1986).
79. Denckla, supra note 52, at 2595–96.
80. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of Admission
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to exclude competitors.81 The opposite situation—“regulatory
competition” in which states compete to provide legal rules to those they
govern because the governed can choose which state’s laws will govern
their actions—promotes more efficient law.82
This burden falls not only on lawyers who are excluded from practice,
but also on the public at large: the higher prices resulting from this
regulation likely cause less affluent members of the public, who often
have the greatest need for legal services, to be priced out of the market.83
Indeed, a common reason individuals do not obtain the services of an
attorney is that the cost is too high.84 The costs resulting from these
inflated prices can ultimately be attributed to states’ provision of a “legal
monopoly” to lawyers, shielding them from competition at the expense of
the public.85
The changing character of modern society exacerbates these costs.
Scholars have long commented on the widespread effects of society’s
continuously increasing mobility, and these effects include an increasing
need to allow multijurisdictional practice.86 Of course, modern society
provides not only the increased physical mobility recognized in the past,
but also practically unlimited virtual mobility through the internet.87 The
Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 147–48 (2004); Wolfram, supra note
6, at 679 (“The reasons given for the restrictions are probably largely pious eyewash. The real
motivation, one strongly suspects, has to do with cutting down on the economic threat posed for instate lawyers—those who make the in-state rules on local practice—by competition with out-of-state
lawyers.”). Note that although these types of barriers might seem to be unlawful, the Supreme Court
has held that they are not generally unconstitutional. See Denckla, supra note 52, at 2583.
81. See United States v. du Pont, 353 U.S. 586, 592 (1957) (“A monopoly involves the power
to . . . exclude competition when the monopolist desires to do so.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Transamerica Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys., 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953))).
82. See Jonathan Klick et al., Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise
Termination, 3 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 355, 366–67 (2009).
83. Denckla, supra note 52, at 2595–96.
84. Id. at 2596.
85. Turfler, supra note 52, at 1916–17.
86. For example, over twenty years ago, scholars recognized that both lawyers and clients had been
becoming increasingly mobile for decades. See Mary C. Daly, Ethics and the Multijurisdictional
Practice of Law: Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multijurisdictional Practice - Is Model Rule 8.5 the
Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 723–24 (1995).
87. See, e.g., Jordan E. Jacobson, A Flexible Approach to Multijurisdictional Practice: Finding
Flexibility and Clarity in Rule 5.5 Using Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 759, 768 (2013) (“[M]odern technology, starting with telephones and fax machines in the
20th century and culminating with computers and the Internet . . . now allows lawyers to interact with
individuals across the country by using the computer in the lawyer’s office.”); cf. Birbrower,
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1998) (recognizing that
modern technology allows an attorney to “‘virtually’ enter [a] state by telephone, fax, e-mail, or
satellite”).
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conflict between an “increasingly shrinking” world and anachronistic
barriers to free movement in the practice of law has led to calls to loosen
the rules impeding multijurisdictional practice.88
A common response to this problem on an individual level has been to
ignore it: one scholar has observed that “[t]here is probably no other rule
that is more ignored by disciplinary authorities and more violated by
lawyers than the rules prohibiting multijurisdictional practice.”89 Indeed,
it is “virtually impossible” for most modern lawyers to avoid violating
these rules, at least when broadly interpreted.90 This flouting of the rules
is particularly conspicuous for in-house corporate practice: corporate
counsel blithely ignore state rules against unauthorized practice, and as
long as they provide services solely to a single corporation, state bars tend
to turn a blind eye.91
However, not every state bar is willing to turn a blind eye to such
behavior. In Washington State, for example, even in-house counsel are
now starting to feel the pinch: the state’s regulations on practice of law
now require in-house counsel who are members of another state’s bar but
work for corporations in Washington to pay for a special license to
practice law.92 This licensing process does not try to pass itself off as
protecting consumers; the counsel receive no rights to practice beyond
what they otherwise did (for instance, practice limited to their corporate
employer), and are required to pass no additional examinations.93 Yet the
rule does make sure to impose multiple fees on in-house counsel,94 leading
some commentators to observe, upon the rule’s promulgation in 2013, that
it amounted to a mere “money grab.”95 Since widespread practice had
already shown there to be no justification for additional consumer
protection from this kind of practice,96 the only explanation for the rule
88. See, e.g., Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth (Nineteenth)
Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 415, 484–85 (2012).
89. Id. at 485.
90. Id.; see also Lewis, supra note 6, at 634 (asserting that lawyers violate laws against
multijurisdictional practice on a habitual, daily basis).
91. See Daly, supra note 86, at 729–31.
92. WASH. ADMISSION AND PRACTICE R. 8(f).
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Law: Washington In-House Counsel Face New Rules, Fees, PUGET SOUND BUS. J. (Aug 23,
2013, 3:00 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/print-edition/2013/08/23/law-washington-inhouse-counsel-face.html [https://perma.cc/DP9E-P77K].
96. Cf. Daly, supra note 86, at 729–30 (describing in-house counsel’s characterization of “the current
state-based admission system [as] inefficient and unnecessary,” and discussing how a marketplace solution
of ignoring the rules has effectively “superseded the state-based admissions system”).
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seems to be simple rent-seeking by the state bar.
As more and more of lawyers’ practice involves multiple jurisdictions,
the old methods of regulating legal practice suffer ever-increasing strain:
on the one hand, individual lawyers find themselves subject to conflicting
and contradictory rules governing their practice,97 and on the other, the
public is harmed by elevated costs of legal services.98 This threatens to
stifle the growth of multijurisdictional legal practice, preventing the legal
market from properly responding to the changing realities of society.99 At
the very least, imposing these burdens upon the public demands a
substantial justification. Unfortunately, as discussed in the next section,
the justifications proffered for the status quo are wanting.100
D.

Justifications Asserted for the Current System of Regulation

Proponents of the present system have put forth various arguments to
justify states’ regulation of the practice of law. These justifications
include providing consumer protection, affecting public perception of
lawyers, and providing for attorney discipline. However, as discussed
below, the extent to which these arguments justify the current system is
unsatisfactory.
The main argument used to defend the current system of self-regulation
by lawyers is that it “protects the public from incompetent providers” by
setting standards for competent practice of law.101 As a broad justification
for standards, this certainly has merit,102 yet this argument cannot be
stretched to justify the degree of restriction actually imposed.
An effect of laws banning unauthorized practice of law is to push
marginal consumers of legal services out of the market.103 Those deprived
of legal services by potential lawyers who fall just short of the standards
set by a state must instead proceed pro se.104 The fact that the alternative
97. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics., 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 345–46 (1994)
(describing the practical issues involved when lawyers are subject to conflicting regulations from
multiple jurisdictions).
98. See Denckla, supra note 52, at 2595–96.
99. See Guttenberg, supra note 88 (arguing that law practice “is being stifled by rules that hinder
innovation and competition”); Turfler, supra note 52, at 1942–43 (noting that “law practice is
becoming more national in scope” and that barriers to multijurisdictional practice make “regulation
of the practice of law over the Internet difficult”).
100. See infra section I.D.
101. Turfler, supra note 52, at 1916–17.
102. See id. at 1919–21 (arguing that by assuring a basic level of general competence, unauthorized
practice laws may address “information asymmetry” problems).
103. Id. at 1916.
104. Barton, supra note 59, at 447–48.
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to unauthorized legal representation is to proceed pro se undermines any
argument that unauthorized practice regulations protect the public from
poor representation, since a layman is presumably worse-equipped to
handle legal issues than a subpar lawyer.105
The difficulty of bar exams relative to the degree of quality assurance
they provide supports the same conclusion: bar exams, despite being quite
difficult, guarantee little legal competency in practice, suggesting that
they are “designed more to limit the number of lawyers than to guarantee
any set level of competence.”106 But even if the need for general legal
competence could justify a program of legal licensure, that need alone
would not justify state-based monopolies on the practice of law, since a
uniform interstate standard would equally serve that end with less harm to
competition.
A more nuanced argument in this vein is that state-specific regulation
is needed to ensure “familiarity with local rules and customs.”107 In
essence, the argument is that states need to individually test applicants to
ensure their knowledge of state law before they practice in the state.108
However, it is doubtful that this need is legitimate.109 Indeed, although
some states do specifically test state and local law, the need to test lawyers
from a diverse range of backgrounds limits the degree of specialization
that can be tested in a given field.110 The result is that there is “nothing
about a state-law-specific test on local law that would enable a bar
examiner to determine anything beyond the kind of general legal
competence that more national concept testing already achieves.”111
Furthermore, most states place the lion’s share of their testing weight
in the multistate portions of the bar exam.112 Given these limitations, one
scholar remarked that “it is difficult to take seriously the idea that a
member of a particular state’s bar can be presumed to have a better
knowledge of its law—the principal rationale for the exclusion of out-of-

105. Id.
106. Id. at 446.
107. Kristen M. Blankley et al., Multijurisdictional ADR Practice: Lessons for Litigators, 11
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 29, 30 (2009).
108. See Perlman, supra note 80, at 171–73.
109. See id. at 171–72 (“[T]here is no evidence that a lawyer’s knowledge of state-specific law (or
lack thereof) is a better indicator of an attorney’s competence than nationally based examinations that
the attorney already has passed.”).
110. See id. at 172.
111. Id.
112. William H. Simon, Who Needs the Bar?: Professionalism without Monopoly, 30 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 639, 647 (2003).
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state lawyers.”113 Thus, the admission requirements adopted by state bars
reveal that the real criterion for competent practice is general legal
knowledge, rather than specialized competence in state law that might
justify a local monopoly.
The public-harm justification is also undermined by the existence of
alternative means of assuring quality without stifling competition. One
example is certification regimes.114 Under a certification regime,
admission to practice is not restricted (or is restricted to a lesser degree),
but attorneys can obtain a certification in specific legal fields (or perhaps
general practice).115 Because obtaining certification is voluntary, lawyers
cannot use it to entirely exclude competitionl; if the costs of certification
are raised too high, this will “induce the public to use non-certified
practitioners.”116 This generally improves incentives for lawyers and for
certification agencies, rendering certification typically less harmful than
licensure while providing most of the benefits for which licensure is
urged.117
Regulations on the practice of law have also been defended on the basis
of public perception.118 The basic idea is that, by treating attorneys as
members of an exclusive and altruistic profession, clients would be more
likely to trust lawyers not to use their unique position against them when
handling the clients’ affairs.119 The idea is that “[w]hen the public views
the provision of legal services as honorable, this in turn breeds respect for
the law, which then promotes social order.”120 However, like the need for
generalized competence, the need for generalized professionalism is not
premised on the need for state-specific monopolies over the practice of
law, but on “promot[ing] respect for the law and general societal good”121
for the “legal services market” as a whole,122 so that argument alone does
not demonstrate benefits of state-specific regulations relative to uniform,
nationwide standards.

113. Id.
114. Barton, supra note 59, at 447.
115. See id.
116. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 149 (1962).
117. See id.
118. Turfler, supra note 52, at 1923–24.
119. Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1239–40
(1995).
120. Turfler, supra note 52, at 1924.
121. Id. at 1924.
122. Id. at 1908.
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Another proffered justification for state-specific control is providing
courts with a mechanism to “exercise disciplinary control over a lawyer
for professional misconduct.”123 To the extent a method of dealing with
attorney misconduct is necessary, that is a function that state bars
currently fulfill.124 But this only weakly supports a justification based on
a need for competence, because few lawyers are actually disciplined for
incompetence, rather than for other failings.125 Moreover, the most
common causes of malpractice claims are not related to matters tested on
state bar exams.126
However, to the extent there is a need for disciplinary control, this
justification does not specifically require state-level enforcement. For incourt misconduct, courts can directly punish the lawyer in question,127 for
example by revoking the privilege of appearing in the court. On the other
hand, out-of-court misconduct tends to involve issues not unique to any
particular state.128 Furthermore, the state-centric method of regulating
practice actually limits the effectiveness of court oversight: where an outof-state lawyer is not licensed to practice in a state, it can limit the
sanctions available.129 For example, the bar of one jurisdiction cannot
unilaterally disbar a lawyer from practice in another jurisdiction of which
the lawyer is a bar member.130 If anything, the need to be able to discipline
lawyers who may be practicing across state lines suggests that methods of
interstate discipline may be needed.
The necessity of bans on interstate practice for lawyers admitted to the
bar of a state is also undermined, as a practical matter, by examples of
123. WOLFRAM, supra note 78, at 865.
124. See id. (discussing justifications for local licensing power, including “assuring that courts of
that state will be able to exercise disciplinary control over a lawyer for professional misconduct”).
Some authorities are lukewarm on the extent to which such rules actually provide benefit. See, e.g.,
Barton, supra note 59, at 448–49, 49 n.77 (observing that disciplinary rules mostly duplicate existing
common law obligations, rendering them “of questionable value,” but also recognizing that “repeating
a common law standard as lawyer regulation may, in fact, serve a salutary purpose”).
125. Guttenberg, supra note 88, at 471.
126. Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam Should Change, 81
NEB. L. REV. 363, 383–84 (2002).
127. See Turfler, supra note 52, at 1905 n.11 (“State courts have long claimed the inherent authority
to regulate the practice of law and lawyers.”)
128. See generally Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Disbarment or Suspension of Attorney in One
State as Affecting Right to Continue Practice in Another State, 81 A.L.R.3d 1281, § 2a (1977),
Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2019) (detailing the tendency of states to recognize other states’
determinations of misconduct for disciplinary purposes when a lawyer was a member of both states’
bars).
129. See Jonathan Rose, Unauthorized Practice of Law in Arizona: A Legal and Political Problem
That Won’t Go Away, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 585, 598–99 (2002).
130. See Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957).
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multijurisdictional authorization in various jurisdictions. For example, the
European
Union
has
authorized
essentially
unrestricted
multijurisdictional practice, in which admission to one nation’s bar
authorizes practice in each other’s.131 More precisely, a lawyer who is a
member of the bar in one European country can practice outside of court,
including giving legal advice, throughout Europe.132 In-court practice is
not automatically permitted; instead, the court in question can condition
practice on the equivalent of pro hac vice admission.133
Given the European Union’s success in authorizing this type of
practice, it is doubtful that any justification for maintaining the current
system of localized monopolies in the United States holds water.134 Along
with the European Union, both Australia and Canada now allow attorneys
free movement across state (or provincial) lines.135 Furthermore, at least
one state has already moved in this direction on its own: Colorado allows
out-of-state lawyers to practice in Colorado but requires pro hac vice
admission to litigate.136
Even if reform of the current system of regulating legal practice is
necessary, scholars have criticized the idea of a national bar as impractical
and apt to create an unworkable bureaucracy.137 This criticism may have
131. See generally Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the European
Union: Lessons for the United States?, 34 INT’L L. 307 (describing how multijurisdictional practice
is now the norm throughout the European Union).
132. See D. Bruce Shine, The European Union’s Lack of Internal Borders in the Practice of Law:
A Model for the United States?, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 207, 239 (2002); Florence R. Liu,
Note, The Establishment of a Cross-Border Legal Practice in the European Union, 20 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 369, 373–74 (1997).
133. See Shine, supra note 132, at 230–31.
134. See Guttenberg, supra note 88, at 487 (“[I]t is inconceivable that the European Union could
set up a system that permits the free movement of lawyers between member countries, with their
varying legal regimes, languages, and customs, and we in the United States with a common language,
a unifying legal heritage, considerable uniformity in laws, and an overriding federal legal system,
cannot create a system that permits the easy movement of lawyers across state lines.”).
135. James W. Jones et al., Reforming Lawyer Mobility—Protecting Turf or Serving Clients?, 30
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 148, 178 (2017). In Canada, all of its common-law provinces have signed
the National Mobility Agreement to authorize multijurisdictional practice, but Québec, which follows
a civil-law system, has only agreed to a lesser degree of recognition of outside attorneys. Id. at 180.
The extent to which this may argue for special accommodation of Louisiana, which also has a civillaw system, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
136. Melissa Pender, Multijurisdictional Practice and Alternative Legal Practice Structures:
Learning from EU Liberalization to Implement Appropriate Legal Regulatory Reforms in the United
States, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1575, 1610, 1610 n.173 (2014); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 205.1.
137. See, e.g., Samuel J. Brakel & Wallace D. Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50
WASH. L. REV. 699, 713–14 (1975); Daly, supra note 86, at 781–85. But cf. Malcolm Richard Wilkey,
Proposal for a “United States Bar,” 58 A.B.A. J. 355, 356–58 (1972) (proposing a national bar for
court admissions).
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some merit; accordingly, this Comment argues in favor of a system with
decentralized aspects similar to those adopted by the European Union and
by Colorado.138
II.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO PREEMPT
STATE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE LAW

If a national solution, in any form, is to be adopted for authorizing
multijurisdictional practice of law, a preliminary question is: What kinds
of action can and should Congress take to bring about that solution? This
Part first discusses the constitutional power Congress has to implement a
national system of legal practice,139 then several existing examples of such
authorization by the federal government are discussed.140 Finally, this Part
concludes with a discussion of how other common law systems have
divided up the field of legal practice.141
A.

Constitutional Basis for Federal Preemption for Practice of Law

As an initial matter, states’ current regulations of the practice of law
directly conflict with any potential congressional scheme to authorize
multistate practice of law.142 Accordingly, for Congress to authorize such
practice, it must be able to preempt state law in this arena. As a general
rule, so long as Congress has the authority to legislate over a subject, its
laws will preempt conflicting state laws.143 This preemption can either be
via express preemption, or it can be one of several varieties of implied
preemption, such as “conflict” or “field” preemption.144 In any case, state
law will be preempted so long as Congress indicates its intent to do so
through valid legislation.145 This Comment will accordingly assume that
any legislation passed to this effect will make its intent to preempt clear.
This leaves only the questions of what power Congress has to authorize
practice of law and to what extent it should exercise this power. With
regard to the former question, the Commerce Clause146 is a natural source

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See infra section IV.A.
See infra section II.A.
See infra section II.B.
See infra section II.C.
See supra section I.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 884–85 (2000).
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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of the power to legislate multistate practice of law.147 The Commerce
Clause generally supports laws regulating channels of interstate
commerce, persons or things in interstate commerce, and things that
substantially affect interstate commerce.148 Some exceptions to this broad
power may apply—particularly when considering things that substantially
affect interstate commerce—where traditional areas of State sovereignty
and regulation are impinged.149 On the other hand, where an activity is
economic in nature, Congress has great leeway to regulate things that
substantially affect interstate commerce.150
All currently regulated practice of law involves rendering of services
to others because unauthorized practice statutes do not restrict pro se
litigants.151 Thus, the kinds of practice being regulated involve
commercial activity of some kind.152 Furthermore, the restrictions on
multijurisdictional practice inherently involve interstate activity, since
when states restrict practice by lawyers of other states, the states are
banning practitioners licensed in one state from providing services in
another state.153 Indeed, a major purpose served by the Commerce Clause
is the prevention of economic protectionism by the states—that is, the
prevention of state laws that unfairly restrict interstate commerce for the
benefit of in-state interests.154
Although state regulations of the practice of law might run afoul of the
Dormant Commerce Clause,155 the United States Supreme Court has
recognized “a compelling interest in the practice of professions within
their boundaries” that can justify state regulation where Congress has not
acted.156 Insofar as current regulations on multijurisdictional practice of
law inhibit out-of-state attorneys from selling their services in-state, the

147. See, e.g., Daly, supra note 86, at 782 n.266 (discussing power to regulate interstate commerce
in context of establishing a national bar).
148. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
149. Id. at 564; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615–16 (2000).
150. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942).
151. Barton, supra note 59, at 447; see also WOLFRAM, supra note 78, at 865 n.84 (“The obligation
of a local license does not apply to an out-of-state lawyer appearing pro se any more than a local
license is required for a nonlawyer litigant who appears pro se.”).
152. See Daly, supra note 86, at 782 n.266.
153. See supra section I.A.
154. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978) (discussing antiprotectionism as a justification for Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
155. Indeed, where a state sweeps too much into the scope of practice of law, such a challenge can
prevail. See, e.g., Nat’l Revenue Corp. v. Violet, 807 F.2d 285, 290 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding state’s
treatment of all debt collection as practice of law violated the Commerce Clause).
156. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792–93 (1975).
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Commerce Clause appears to squarely support preemption. Indeed,
scholars have concluded that the Commerce Clause applies because “the
provision of legal services is clearly an economic activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.”157 Although Congress has thus
far abstained from directly regulating the general practice of law,158 the
Supreme Court has found in an antitrust context that the provision of legal
services in a state sufficiently affects interstate commerce to fall within
the purview of the Commerce Clause.159
One area where such legislation could face pushback involves attempts
to require the admission of attorneys to practice before a state’s court
against that court’s will. State courts have traditionally claimed the
authority to regulate the practice of lawyers appearing before them.160
Notably, states have a heightened interest in controlling who is authorized
to appear in their courts, with some courts holding that their authority to
control admissions is constitutionally based, and others holding that it is
an inherent power essential to carry out a court’s duties.161 There is thus
reason to doubt that the federal government could override a state court’s
decisions in this matter.162
By contrast, there is little question that Congress, having broad
constitutional authority to regulate federal courts,163 can institute uniform
rules of admission to federal courts as it sees fit.164 This power is distinct

157. Daly, supra note 86, at 782 n.266; see also Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM.
U. L. REV. 59, 160–61 (2002) (arguing that national regulation relating to provision of legal services
“would be a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power even though it would reach instances of
noncommercial and wholly intrastate activity, because it would regulate a class of activities that is
largely commercial and exerts both a direct and substantial effect on interstate commerce”).
158. See Hadfield, supra note 50, at 1699.
159. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 785.
160. Turfler, supra note 52, at 1905 n.11.
161. Quintin Johnstone, Unauthorized Practice of Law and the Power of State Courts: Difficult
Problems and their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 795, 824–25 (2003).
162. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers,
or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”); Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 163 (1908) (“[A]n injunction against a state court would be a violation
of the whole scheme of our government.”). But cf. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S.,
Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 736, 738 (1980) (allowing injunction against state supreme court in “enforcement
capacit[y],” but recognizing absolute immunity for creation of disciplinary rules in a “legislative
role[]”).
163. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
164. Wilkey, supra note 137, at 358; see also Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1866)
(observing that Congress “may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office” of attorney and
counselor in federal courts).
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from any question of state regulation of the practice of law.165 Thus, while
Congress may wish to independently implement a uniform system of
admission in federal courts,166 it is at least questionable whether it can do
so for state courts.
Accordingly, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the constitutional
authority to implement nationwide rules allowing for multijurisdictional
practice of law at least with regard to out-of-court practice.
B.

Examples of Existing Federal Preemption for Practice of Law

Congress’s power to legislate in the area of practice of law is not just
theoretical; there are multiple examples where it already has.
A clear example of Congressional preemption of state regulations on
practice of law is the field of patent law, in which the federal scheme
preempts state practice of law regulations.167 The federal government
alone determines who may practice patent law; any state laws to the
contrary are irrelevant.168 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
authorizes practice by patent attorneys (attorneys admitted to practice in
a state and before the Patent Office)169 as well as patent agents (“[a]ny
citizen of the United States who is not an attorney, and who fulfills the
requirements” for registration).170 The only substantive requirements for
registration as a patent agent are a demonstration of sufficient technical
knowledge (typically by a qualifying bachelor’s degree) and passage of
an examination (the “patent bar”) that tests Patent Office procedure.171
Despite not being attorneys, patent agents are authorized to practice
law before the Patent Office, including preparing and prosecuting patent
applications and disseminating advice regarding patentability of
inventions.172 In fact, the Federal Circuit has even recognized a “patentagent privilege” similar to attorney-client privilege, due to the recognition
165. Cf. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957) (holding disbarment in state court does
not require disbarment in federal court).
166. See, e.g., Wilkey, supra note 137, at 357.
167. See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 399–401 (1963).
168. See id. at 388.
169. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 11.6(a) (2018); see also 5 U.S.C. § 500(e) (2012)
(exempting patent practitioners from bar membership requirements for administrative representation).
170. 37 C.F.R § 11.6(b) (2018).
171. See id. § 11.7; OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO
PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (2018),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OED_GRB.pdf [https://perma.cc/JA5N-R8BU].
172. Sperry, 373 U.S. at 386, 402 n.47.

17 - Medley(2).docx (Do Not Delete)

10/21/2019 5:08 PM

1442

[Vol. 94:1419

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

that “patent agents are not simply engaging in law-like activity, they are
engaging in the practice of law itself.”173 The federal government has
administered its program for regulating practice before the Patent Office
since the mid-nineteenth century,174 and in recent years has admitted
around six to seven-hundred agents per year.175 Accordingly, the
authorization of patent attorneys and agents represents an example of a
well-established, long-lived federal authorization of the practice of law
that preempts conflicting state practice of law regulations.
In addition to patent law, the federal government has also authorized
practice of law for practice areas involving other federal agencies, thereby
preempting conflicting state laws. One example is immigration law,
which has accredited representatives (which may include attorneys or
laypersons) who are authorized to practice before the Department of
Homeland Security in immigration matters.176 Other agencies that
regulate admission of practitioners for practice include the Security and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).177
Accordingly, the federal government has an established track record in
managing the authorization of legal practice across a range of fields.
C.

The Barrister/Solicitor Distinction

If Congress were to preempt state laws regulating unauthorized practice
of law to authorize multijurisdictional practice, the question would
remain: how far that preemption should go? Even if Congress could
entirely preempt state law in this field, that does not necessarily mean that
it should. But then, where should Congress draw the line? A promising
answer to this question is to divide legal practice into two different types:
in-court and out-of-court practice. As discussed below, this is where other
common law jurisdictions have previously drawn a line between the roles
of barrister and solicitor.
At least two factors, are relevant to the question of line-drawing: First,
the constitutional basis for authorizing legal practice outside of court is
173. In re Queen’s Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
174. See Sperry, 373 U.S. at 388 (“The power of the Commissioner of Patents to regulate practice
before the Patent Office dates back to 1861 . . . .”).
175. Patexia Insight 1: Shortage of Patent Attorneys, PATEXIA (Jul. 6, 2016),
https://www.patexia.com/feed/shortage-of-patent-attorneys-20160706 [https://perma.cc/T3LY-PF5M].
176. 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1(a)(4), 292.2(d) (2019); see also Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 499, 499 n.5
(9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he regulations contemplate representation by accredited laypersons, as well as attorneys.”).
177. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 201.102 (2019) (standards for practice of attorneys and others before
SEC); 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2019) (setting rules for admission of attorneys and others to practice before
IRS).
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generally clearer than the case for mandating admission to practice before
state courts.178 Second, the Federal government generally has more
experience in preempting state regulation of legal practice outside of
courts, since the Federal government tends to authorize practice either in
non-representative capacities or before agencies, and it has not yet tried
to mandate that state courts allow appearances by non-approved
persons.179 This suggests that there may be a natural line for Congress to
draw between the practice of law before courts and practice not before
courts.
Another reason that this division of legal practice represents a natural
place to draw the line is because other common-law jurisdictions have
also drawn the line here; this division is essentially the same as seen in
countries recognizing a distinction between solicitors and barristers.180 In
the United Kingdom, barristers are admitted to represent clients in court,
whereas solicitors generally engage in out-of-court practice as well as act
as a go-between for clients and barristers.181 Solicitors, by contrast,
traditionally could not practice in all courts, though they now have limited
abilities to practice in certain lower courts.182
In essence, a solicitor’s practice encompasses transactional law,
including activities typical of corporate or in-house counsel.183 Solicitors
often interact with barristers in a way similar to how attorneys in one U.S.
jurisdiction engage local trial counsel in another: a solicitor interviews a
client, writes a brief describing the legal issues, and finds a barrister to
represent the client in court.184 The split of the profession is largely
defended on the basis that representation in court (especially high court)
is qualitatively different from other aspects of law, so it requires
specialized skills and a higher level of expertise.185
By contrast, the United States has traditionally fused these two aspects
of legal practice together.186 That is not to say that this Comment urges
178. See supra section II.A.
179. See supra section II.B.
180. See Marylin J. Berger, A Comparative Study of British Barristers and American Legal
Practice and Education, 5 N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 540, 544 (1983).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 558–59, 557 n.70.
183. See Mary C. Daly, Conflicts of Interest in Corporate and Securities Law: Monopolist,
Aristocrat, or Entrepreneur?: A Comparative Perspective on the Future of Multidisciplinary
Partnerships in the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom after the Disintegration
of Andersen Legal, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 589, 616–18 (2002).
184. See Berger, supra note 180, at 545–46.
185. See id. at 559.
186. Id. at 552–53. This is not a universal rule, however. For instance, the examples discussed in
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adopting the British schism in the legal profession. After all, a mixture of
“fused” and “unfused” practice is entirely possible; for example, some
common law jurisdictions allow for “fused” barrister/solicitor
combinations, but also have some practitioners as just one or the other.187
The United States could exploit this natural dividing line in a similar way
while eliminating barriers preventing multijurisdictional practice of law.
As discussed in Part III, this could avoid problems surrounding
ambiguous definition of practice of law while maintaining some state
control over the aspects of legal practice in which states have the greatest
interest.
III. CONGRESS CAN AUTHORIZE MULTISTATE PRACTICE OF
LAW USING THE BARRISTER/SOLICITOR DISTINCTION
AS A DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
INTERESTS
State regulations restricting unauthorized practice of law have
produced a system that imposes unjustifiable burdens on multistate
practice of law, harming both lawyers and their clients.188 Congress has
the power to preempt state law in this area, but the question remains how
far such preemption should extend.189 The States have a heightened
interest in their own courtroom proceedings,190 and Congress has greater
experience authorizing practice of law outside the courtroom than inside
it.191 This suggests that the division between in-court and out-of-court
legal practice provides a natural place for Congress to draw the line.192
This Part provides a detailed description of why this division is justified.
A.

Direct Preemption is Available for Solicitor-Like Legal Practice
In terms of solicitor-like practice, Congress has both the power to

Section II.B of Congress authorizing non-lawyer representation before agencies but not in the courts
closely resemble the type of practice authorized for British solicitors.
187. See, e.g., Virginia Grainer, The Lawyer’s Obligation to Provide Wisdom Advice and to Know
Their Client: Is United States Law Susceptible to the New Zealand Development?, 31 J. LEGAL PROF.
97, 98 (2007) (describing existence of fused and barrister-only practice in New Zealand); Bobette
Wolski, Reform of the Civil Justice System 25 Years Past: (In)adequate Responses from Law Schools
and Professional Associations? (And How Best to Change the Behaviour of Lawyers), 40 COMMON
L. WORLD REV. 40, 67–68,67 n.190 (2011) (distinction retained in only three Australian states).
188. See supra Part I.
189. See supra Part II.
190. See supra section II.A.
191. See supra section II.B.
192. See supra section II.C.
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preempt state law and a proven track record of doing so.193 Solicitor-like
practice involves provision of out-of-court legal services, such as
providing legal advice, drafting contracts, and engaging local counsel to
represent clients in court proceedings—generally the type of services
provided by an “office lawyer.”194 When a client hires a lawyer to provide
legal services, the lawyer is engaging in commerce, since the sale of
services is a commercial activity.195 When lawyers from one state provide
such services in another state—that is, when the lawyer engages in
multijurisdictional practice of law—this activity both involves persons in
interstate commerce and substantially affects interstate commerce.196 This
activity thus falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause, giving
Congress the power to regulate it.197 Congressional legislation authorizing
this kind of interstate practice of law would properly preempt state laws
banning unauthorized practice.198
Enhancing the prospect of Congress’s ability to produce a workable
system for authorizing solicitor-like practice is the fact that Congress
already has practice doing so in various fields of federal law. As discussed
above, Congress has authorized types of legal practice involving specific
federal issues, and it has preempted state laws regarding unauthorized
practice in doing so.199 Congress’s successful experience in regulating
out-of-court legal practice in limited fields makes it more plausible that
Congress can succeed in doing so for general legal practice.
Furthermore, a rule authorizing out-of-court multijurisdictional
practice would also eliminate much of the uncertainty involved in
unauthorized practice of law. While there may be doubt about which states
a lawyer is practicing in when giving advice to a client or drafting a
contract for a client connected to another jurisdiction,200 there is no doubt
about whether a lawyer is appearing before a state’s courts. A rule
authorizing lawyers admitted to one state’s bar to practice in a solicitorlike capacity in any state would thus replace a fuzzy, difficult-to-apply

193. See supra sections II.A and II.B.
194. Berger, supra note 180, at 544.
195. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 550 (2012) (“The power to regulate
commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be regulated.”). Pro bono work might
appear to be an exception, but it is still an activity that affects interstate commerce, since pro bono
work is a direct substitute for commercial legal services.
196. See supra section II.A.
197. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
198. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990).
199. See supra section II.B.
200. See supra section I.A (discussing the unclear boundaries of the practice of law).
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rule with an easy-to-apply, bright-line rule.
B.

Direct Preemption May Not be Proper for Barrister-Like Legal
Practice

In contrast to solicitor-like practice, barrister-like practice involves
representation in court.201 The state has an increased interest at stake in
this kind of practice, as state courts have traditionally considered
themselves to have an inherent power, or even a constitutional power, to
regulate who practices law before them.202 Congressional action
impinging this assumed right by state courts might thus meet more
resistance. For example, regulation mandating admissions to practice
before state courts—either by requiring action by state judges or
legislation by state legislatures—may be opposed as involving improper
coercion of states, exceeding Congress’s Article I powers and potentially
violating the Tenth Amendment.203 Meanwhile, the Commerce Clause
provides less justification for regulating state court admissions, since
admission to represent a party before a state court—like state criminal
laws—involves an “area[] of traditional state concern” that is arguably
more about regulating conduct in court than about “regulation of
commercial activities.”204 In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized
that the role lawyers have in the judicial process as “officers of the courts”
justifies an “especially great” interest in regulating lawyers.205
And even if Congress could overrule state court admissions rules, it is
not so clear it should. Whereas all lawyers practice law, most lawyers are
not litigators,206 so there is less potential harm from keeping state courts
in charge of in-court practice. Furthermore, while the practice of law
outside the courtroom is plagued with uncertain boundaries,207 there is not
much uncertainty as to whether a lawyer has appeared in a given court.
And the availability of pro hac vice admission provides an alternative
201. Berger, supra note 180, at 544; see also supra section II.C (discussing limitation of solicitor
representation to certain lower courts, with high court representation restricted to barristers).
202. See Johnstone, supra note 161, at 824–25; Turfler, supra note 52, at 1905 n.11.
203. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding unconstitutional law compelling
action by state officials); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal
Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”).
204. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995); see also Turfler, supra note 52, at 1905 n.11
(collecting references discussing the longstanding practice of state court control over practice of law).
205. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
206. Bruce J. Winick, Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: Meeting the
Challenge of the New ABA Standards, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 429, 430 (2005).
207. See supra section I.A.
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method to appear in court that is simply not available for out-of-court
practice.208 The idea that there is less cause for Congress to intervene in
court admissions is also supported by Congress’s own past behavior:
whereas Congress plainly has the power to regulate admissions in federal
court,209 it has not done so, even though it has repeatedly authorized outof-court legal practice.210 Finally, the ground is much better laid for the
authorization of solicitor-like practice than for barrister-like practice; not
only the European Union but also the state of Colorado have chosen to
hold in-court appearance to a separate, higher standard.211
Thus, Congress need not override state courts’ control of their own
admission of lawyers.
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CAN CREATE A
COMPETITIVE SYSTEM OF BAR ADMISSIONS
As discussed above, there is a need for Congress to preempt state laws
regarding multijurisdictional practice of law. This Part outlines a method
Congress could use to eliminate the system of localized monopolies
created by state unauthorized practice laws while allowing the states to
continue to participate in regulating practice of law.
A.

Congress Can Transform Bar Admission into a Competitive System
by Eliminating State Bars’ Power of Exclusion

With regard to out-of-courtroom practice, one possibility is for
Congress to eliminate local state bars and replace them with a federal
bar.212 However, the idea of “a unitary system of admission and
discipline” has been criticized as “unrealistic as a matter of politics,
unworkable as a matter of administration, and unsound as a matter of
policy,” because the resulting centralized system would be costly and
inefficient.213 However, this criticism would not apply to a decentralized
system like that of the European Union.214
The federal government should take advantage of the existing state bar
system to create a decentralized admission process similar to that in the

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See supra section I.B (discussing pro hac vice admission).
See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1866).
See supra section II.B.
See supra section I.D.
Daly, supra note 86, at 782.
Id. at 782–83.
See Goebel, supra note 131, at 312–13.
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European Union, enabling authorization of national practice with limited
federal interference. Basically, each state would continue to operate its
own bar and make its own admission decisions. The federal government
would then set standards, such that admission to a state’s bar qualifies for
admission to national practice if the state has standards at least as high as
the centralized standards. For example, the federal standard could be a
sufficient score on the UBE and MPRE, mimicking many states’ current
standards.215 Thus, each state would be put into a competitive position
compared to other states for bar admission: setting standards too low
would fail to meet the federal standard, but setting standards unreasonably
high would encourage attorneys to seek admission through other states.
The system outlined above leaves out one important aspect of
regulation of the practice of law: disciplinary proceedings such as
disbarment.216 For disbarment to work in a decentralized system, there
must be some way to resolve conflicts between different states’ bars. In
general, if a state wants to disbar someone, other states will probably
agree,217 so a solution in most cases is to allow any state to disbar a lawyer
that has practiced in that state. The only problem is when there is a
conflict: State A wants to sanction an attorney, but State B disagrees. In
such a case, a federal agency would act in an appellate capacity to resolve
the dispute and determine appropriate sanctions.
This limited involvement may prevent federal overreach and alleviate
some state objections to national involvement in authorizing practice of
law.218 For example, lawyers from affected localities would still have
some control in discipline, but with limited monopoly power, since each
state’s bar is now in competition for applicants. Meanwhile, by
eliminating the local monopolies, this competitive approach would
mitigate the harms resulting from those monopolies.219
Another common objection to a national bar is the need for competency
specifically in local law.220 However, to the extent to which this is a
serious concern, states can implement certification systems to inform

215. See supra section I.B (discussing current state use of the UBE and MPRE).
216. See supra section I.D (discussing the need for disciplinary control and limitations on state
discipline of out-of-state lawyers).
217. For example, disbarment or suspension in one state has frequently been treated as conclusive
evidence of misconduct in other states, justifying similar disciplinary actions in those other states. See
Shapiro, supra note 128, § 2a.
218. See supra section I.D (discussing objections to loss of local control).
219. See supra sections I.B, I.C (discussing the burdens resulting from allowing local bars to exert
monopoly control over legal practice).
220. See supra section I.D.
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clients of specializations in local law.221 Several states (and some private
entities) have implemented systems for certifying lawyers as specialists in
a particular field;222 expertise in local state law could simply be one more
type of specialization. Although some may argue certification is
insufficient on its own,223 in combination with minimum standards of
competency in law on the national level, this may be an effective
compromise. In particular, the combination would allow specialization in
a state’s law if needed, while allowing nonspecialized practice without
undue state interference.
Thus, by replacing the current system of local monopolies on bar
admission with a competitive system for authorizing transactional practice
of law, Congress can reduce the harms of state monopolies and keep the
benefits of decentralized discipline. Furthermore, authorizing multistate
practice for solicitor-like practice would provide multistate practitioners
with a bright-line rule to determine whether practice involving a state’s
laws is authorized.
CONCLUSION
States currently impose broad restrictions on lawyers’ abilities to
engage in multijurisdictional practice of law.224 Exerting local control
over admissions, states produce barriers to entry for new lawyers as well
as lawyers from other jurisdictions.225 The resulting local monopolies
impose substantial burdens on competition, negatively affecting both
clients and attorneys.226 Although ostensibly justified as a consumer
protection measure, the resulting monopolies fail to achieve this goal and
harm the public.227
To address the harms resulting from local monopolies in legal practice,

221. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 59, at 447 (discussing certification as an alternative to licensing).
222. See Thomas P. Sartwelle, Trial Lawyers, Plumbers, and Electricians: Should They All Be
Certified?, 59 S. TEX. L. REV. 59, 64 (2017) (counting eleven states with specialist-certification plans,
plus eight more states that have chosen to accredit private certifiers, as well as “seven national private
ABA-approved certifiers”).
223. See Barton, supra note 59, at 447, 447 n.67 (mentioning that certification may share some
problems with licensure, but also solves problems licensure does not). But see FRIEDMAN, supra note
116, at 149 (“I personally find it difficult to see any case for which licensure rather than certification
can be justified.”).
224. See supra section I.A.
225. See supra section I.B.
226. See supra section I.C.
227. See supra section I.D.
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the federal government can and should intervene.228 Due to both practical
and constitutional constraints, this intervention should be focused on
authorizing only a portion of modern practice of law: the type of out-ofcourt practice that quintessentially defines the role of solicitors in other
common-law jurisdictions.229 Under such a model, the federal government
could create a more competitive landscape for the licensing of out-ofcourt practice, eliminating significant burdens present in the current
system without introducing a centralized bureaucracy for handling bar
membership.230

228. See supra sections II.A, II.B.
229. See supra section II.C, Part III.
230. See supra section IV.A.

